An Analytical Study of the Political, Economic, and Constitutional Damage to Pakistan During the Rule of General Ayub Khan (1958–1969)


Abstract

General Muhammad Ayub Khan’s rule represents Pakistan’s first prolonged experience with military governance. Although his regime is frequently associated with economic planning and infrastructural development, it also inflicted serious and long-lasting damage on Pakistan’s democratic institutions, constitutional order, political culture, and federal cohesion. This research paper critically examines the adverse consequences of Ayub Khan’s governance, including the erosion of democracy, institutional decay, regional inequality—especially between East and West Pakistan—the concentration of wealth among elites, suppression of civil liberties, and the institutionalization of military dominance. The paper argues that many of Pakistan’s persistent political and constitutional crises have their origins in decisions taken during Ayub Khan’s era.

Keywords: Ayub Khan, Martial Law, Pakistan Democracy, East Pakistan, Civil–Military Relations

1. Introduction

Pakistan was founded with the vision of constitutional governance and representative democracy. However, political instability during the early post-independence years weakened civilian institutions and created space for military intervention. In October 1958, General Muhammad Ayub Khan imposed martial law, abrogated the constitution, and dissolved elected bodies, marking Pakistan’s first direct military takeover.

This paper examines the damage caused to Pakistan during Ayub Khan’s rule, focusing not only on immediate political changes but also on their long-term structural consequences. While some economic initiatives were undertaken, this study contends that authoritarian governance undermined democratic development, national unity, and institutional integrity.

2. Imposition of Martial Law and the Breakdown of Constitutional Rule

The imposition of martial law in 1958 dismantled Pakistan’s constitutional framework. The abrogation of the 1956 Constitution eliminated parliamentary governance and replaced it with centralized military authority. This act weakened the principle of constitutional supremacy and established force as a legitimate means of political change.¹

The long-term impact was severe. Democratic continuity was disrupted, political legitimacy was eroded, and future military interventions found justification in this initial precedent.

3. The Basic Democracies System: Controlled Political Participation

Ayub Khan introduced the Basic Democracies system in 1959, claiming it would promote grassroots democracy. In practice, it functioned as a mechanism to control political participation and legitimize authoritarian rule.²

The system:

  • Prevented direct elections at the national level
  • Marginalized political parties
  • Concentrated power in the presidency

As a result, political development was stunted, and democratic norms failed to mature.

4. Centralization of Power and Institutional Weakness

Ayub Khan’s governance relied on excessive centralization. Executive authority dominated the political system, while parliament and the judiciary were subordinated.³

This concentration of power:

  • Undermined institutional independence
  • Reduced accountability
  • Encouraged personalized rule

The weakening of institutions had lasting consequences, making democratic recovery difficult even after the end of military rule.

5. Regional Inequality and the East Pakistan Crisis

One of the gravest failures of Ayub Khan’s regime was its handling of East Pakistan. Despite its larger population and economic contribution, East Pakistan remained politically marginalized and economically neglected.⁴

5.1 Economic Disparities

Revenue generated from East Pakistan—particularly through jute exports—was largely invested in West Pakistan. Industrial development and infrastructure spending overwhelmingly favored West Pakistani regions.⁵

5.2 Political Alienation

Bengalis were underrepresented in the military and civil bureaucracy, and their political demands were systematically ignored. This inequality fostered resentment and alienation, ultimately contributing to the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.

6. Economic Growth and the Concentration of Wealth

Ayub Khan’s regime promoted industrialization, but its benefits were confined to a narrow elite. By the late 1960s, economic power was concentrated among a small number of families who controlled major sectors of the economy.⁶

This unequal growth:

  • Deepened class divisions
  • Increased social unrest
  • Undermined economic justice

Economic development without equity weakened national cohesion.

7. Suppression of Political Opposition and Civil Liberties

Political dissent during Ayub Khan’s rule was systematically suppressed. Laws were enacted to restrict political activity, censor the press, and control labor unions and student organizations.⁷

The suppression of civil liberties:

  • Eliminated peaceful channels for opposition
  • Encouraged political radicalization
  • Reduced government accountability

This environment damaged Pakistan’s democratic culture and intellectual freedom.

8. The 1965 War and Leadership Failure

Ayub Khan’s strategic decisions during the 1965 Indo-Pak War exposed weaknesses in political judgment and military planning. The conflict ended without decisive gains, and the subsequent Tashkent Declaration generated widespread public dissatisfaction.⁸

The perception of diplomatic failure severely damaged Ayub Khan’s credibility and intensified political opposition against his regime.

9. Institutionalization of Military Dominance

Ayub Khan blurred the distinction between civilian and military spheres. Military officers were appointed to key administrative positions, and the armed forces gained influence in economic and political decision-making.⁹

This institutionalization of military dominance permanently altered Pakistan’s power structure, weakening civilian supremacy and democratic governance.

10. Public Resistance and the Collapse of the Regime

By 1968–69, widespread protests erupted across Pakistan. Students, workers, and political groups mobilized against inflation, inequality, and authoritarian rule.¹⁰

These mass movements exposed the failure of Ayub Khan’s governance model and forced his resignation in 1969.

11. Long-Term Consequences for Pakistan

The legacy of Ayub Khan’s rule includes:

  • Fragile democratic traditions
  • Persistent regional grievances
  • Economic inequality
  • Recurrent military intervention in politics

These structural problems continue to challenge Pakistan’s political stability.

12. Conclusion

General Ayub Khan’s era was a defining moment in Pakistan’s history. While limited economic planning and infrastructural development occurred, these achievements came at the cost of democracy, federal harmony, and constitutional integrity.

This study concludes that the damage inflicted during Ayub Khan’s rule outweighed its short-term gains. Pakistan’s experience demonstrates that sustainable development requires democratic continuity, inclusive governance, and civilian supremacy—principles undermined during this period.

Footnotes

1.     K Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (George Allen & Unwin, 1957) 112–118.

2.     Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 38–44.

3.     Hamza Alavi, ‘The Military and Politics in Pakistan’ (1973) 8(28) Economic and Political Weekly 1411–1415.

4.     Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (Hurst & Company 2009) 143–151.

5.     Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making (Oxford University Press, 1980) 89–96.

6.     S Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Oxford University Press, 2005) 67–72.

7.     Ishtiaq Ahmed, State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia (Pinter 1998) 121–128.

8.     Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (Sang-e-Meel Publications 2000) 198–205.

9.     ibid 206–210.

10.                        Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Oxford University Press, 1997) 214–220.

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