Damage Inflicted on Pakistan by General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008):
A Critical Legal and Political Analysis
Abstract
General Pervez Musharraf’s rule
marked one of the most consequential periods in Pakistan’s constitutional and
political history. While initially justified as a corrective intervention, his
military takeover and subsequent governance inflicted serious and long-lasting
damage on Pakistan’s democratic development, constitutionalism, institutional
balance, internal security, and socio-economic stability. This paper critically
examines Musharraf’s regime through constitutional, political, and governance
perspectives, arguing that his policies weakened democratic norms, undermined
judicial independence, intensified militancy, and entrenched civil–military
imbalance. The study concludes that Musharraf’s era represents a cautionary
example of authoritarian governance masked as reform.
1.
Introduction
Pakistan has experienced repeated
interruptions of democratic rule by military interventions. Among these,
General Pervez Musharraf’s coup of 12 October 1999 stands out due to its
length, international support, and far-reaching consequences. Musharraf
justified his seizure of power on the grounds of corruption, economic
mismanagement, and political instability. However, the outcomes of his rule
reveal a pattern of constitutional violations, institutional decay, and policy
failures that continue to affect Pakistan.
This paper critically evaluates the
damage inflicted on Pakistan during Musharraf’s rule, focusing on
constitutional breakdown, democratic erosion, judicial suppression, economic
fragility, security crises, and governance failures.
2.
Constitutional Breakdown and Military Coup
2.1
Abrogation of the Constitution
Musharraf’s first and most
fundamental act of damage was the suspension of the Constitution of 1973. By
imposing emergency rule and later validating his coup through the judiciary,
Musharraf reinforced the dangerous doctrine that military intervention could be
retrospectively legitimised. This undermined constitutional supremacy and
entrenched extra-constitutional rule as a recurring feature of Pakistani
governance.¹
2.2
Distortion of Democratic Structures
Although elections were held in
2002, they lacked fairness and independence. Musharraf amended the Constitution
through the Legal Framework Order (LFO), granting himself sweeping presidential
powers, including dissolution of the National Assembly.² Democracy was reduced
to a managed process subordinated to military authority.
3.
Political Engineering and Democratic Decay
Musharraf actively manipulated the
political landscape by creating the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), often described
as the “King’s Party.” Through coercion, inducements, and accountability
pressure, politicians were forced into compliance. This eroded political ethics
and weakened genuine party development.³
The resulting political system
lacked legitimacy and public trust, reinforcing cynicism toward democracy and
encouraging authoritarian tendencies.
4.
Assault on Judicial Independence
4.1
The 2007 Judicial Crisis
Perhaps the most damaging episode of
Musharraf’s rule was his confrontation with the judiciary. When Chief Justice
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry challenged executive authority, Musharraf suspended
him and later imposed emergency rule on 3 November 2007. Judges who refused to
take the oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order were dismissed.⁴
4.2
Impact on Rule of Law
This assault on judicial
independence shattered the separation of powers. Lawyers were arrested, courts
were shut down, and fundamental rights were suspended. The episode exposed the
fragility of Pakistan’s legal system under authoritarian pressure.⁵
5.
Economic Policies and Structural Damage
5.1
Illusion of Growth
Musharraf’s era is often associated
with economic growth. However, this growth was largely driven by foreign aid
and remittances following Pakistan’s alliance with the United States after
9/11. Structural reforms were neglected, and growth was consumption-led rather
than productivity-based.⁶
5.2
Long-Term Economic Consequences
By the end of Musharraf’s rule,
Pakistan faced rising debt, trade imbalances, inflation, and energy shortages.
Poverty and inequality increased, particularly in rural areas. The apparent
prosperity collapsed once external inflows declined, exposing the weakness of
Musharraf’s economic model.⁷
6.
War on Terror and Internal Security Crisis
6.1
Strategic Submission Without Consensus
Musharraf unilaterally aligned
Pakistan with the US-led War on Terror without parliamentary approval or
national debate. This abrupt policy shift destabilised Pakistan’s security
environment and undermined sovereignty.⁸
6.2
Spread of Militancy
Military operations in tribal areas
were poorly planned and lacked political backing. Militancy spread across
Pakistan, leading to suicide bombings, sectarian violence, and mass civilian
casualties. Thousands of Pakistanis lost their lives, and internal displacement
increased dramatically.⁹
7.
Balochistan: Militarisation and Alienation
Musharraf’s approach to Balochistan
relied heavily on military force rather than political dialogue. The killing of
Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 symbolised the state’s coercive posture.¹⁰
This policy deepened alienation,
intensified insurgency, and permanently damaged trust between Baloch citizens
and the federal government.
8.
Media Freedom: Controlled Liberalisation
While private television channels
expanded under Musharraf, media freedom remained conditional. During political
crises, especially in 2007, channels were shut down and journalists arrested.¹¹
This selective tolerance weakened freedom of expression and reinforced
authoritarian controls.
9.
Institutional Imbalance and Civil–Military Relations
Musharraf institutionalised military
dominance by strengthening bodies such as the National Security Council.
Civilian institutions remained subordinate, preventing the emergence of
effective democratic governance.¹²
This imbalance continued after
Musharraf’s departure, leaving elected governments weak and dependent.
10.
Governance Failure and Loss of Legitimacy
The National Reconciliation
Ordinance (NRO) contradicted Musharraf’s accountability narrative by granting
amnesty to politicians accused of corruption.¹³ This destroyed public
confidence and normalised elite impunity.
By 2008, Musharraf faced opposition
from political parties, lawyers, media, and civil society, ultimately resigning
under pressure.
11.
Conclusion
General Pervez Musharraf’s rule
inflicted profound damage on Pakistan’s constitutional order, democratic
development, institutional integrity, and internal security. While presented as
a reformist leader, Musharraf entrenched authoritarian governance, weakened the
judiciary, destabilised national security, and left Pakistan economically and
politically fragile.
This period underscores a central
lesson of Pakistan’s history: sustainable progress cannot be achieved through
military rule, constitutional manipulation, or foreign-dependent policies. True
stability lies in democratic continuity, the rule of law, and civilian supremacy.
Footnotes
1.
Hamid Khan, Constitutional and
Political History of Pakistan (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 423–425.
2.
ibid 437–439.
3.
Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military,
State and Society in Pakistan (Palgrave Macmillan 2000) 211–214.
4.
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Judicial
Crisis of Pakistan (Oxford University Press 2009) 98–102.
5.
International Commission of Jurists,
Pakistan: Independence of Judiciary (ICJ 2008) 34–36.
6.
State Bank of Pakistan, Annual
Report 2006–07 (SBP 2007) 45–47.
7.
Ishrat Husain, Governing the
Ungovernable (OUP 2018) 162–165.
8.
Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos
(Penguin 2008) 29–31.
9.
Pakistan Institute for Peace
Studies, Security Report 2008 (PIPS 2009) 12–15.
10.
Akbar S Ahmed, Resistance and
Control in Pakistan (Routledge, 2013) 187–189.
11.
Beena Sarwar, ‘Media and Democracy
in Pakistan’ (2008) 42 Economic and Political Weekly 15–17.
12.
Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy
(Harvard University Press, 2014) 156–158.
13.
Supreme Court of Pakistan, Dr
Mobashir Hassan v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 265) 289–291.